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Abstract 
The Nigerian jihadist-terrorist movement Boko Haram reached international 
notoriety especially after the bombing of an UN-headquarters in Abuja in 2011 
and after the kidnappings of 276 schoolgirls in 2014. But these events are minor 
parts of rapid evolutionary ideological developments and expansion. In 2009 
Boko Haram´s leader, Mohammad Yusuf, was killed by Nigerian forces and the 
movement was considered defeated. But it resurfaced under the leadership of 
Abubakar Shekau and rapid transnational expansion followed, along significant 
medial presence through Shekau´s published sermons, exhortations and threats 
against western and domestic leaders. These internet-published messages reach 
world-wide audiences and constitute platforms for dissemination and 
constructions of jihadist-ideology. This thesis studies the construction and 
intermediation of jihadist-ideology by Shekau, through his video-messages. 
Shekau is investigated through TCP-theory, regarding him as a charismatic leader 
who in that capacity constructs jihadist-ideology, and develops it in relation to 
specific contextual crisis-points. The thesis shows that Shekau constructs jihadist-
ideological themes of apostate Muslim and Christian oppression and persecution 
in collaboration with the West. Two main lines of thought constructed are that the 
ideology of secular democracy is furthered by these actors in order to dominate 
and persecute Muslims world-wide, and that jihadists are victims instead of 
terrorists.  
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1  Introduction and purpose 
“And between us and you is enmity, hatred forever…)” 
 
Abubakar Shekau (Kassim 2015:192) 
 
These words by Abubakar Shekau, leader of the jihadist Nigerian movement Boko 
Haram have an ominous character, expressing an ideological position in a conflict 
that has taken, so far, over 17 000 lives according to recent Amnesty reports. In 
the course of the insurgency villages and towns have been attacked, burned down, 
women and children kidnapped and government officials, teachers, politicians and 
traditional leaders have been executed as “disbelievers”. In areas under Boko 
Haram control strict Sharia-laws are enforced and religious education, customs 
and prayers are mandatory. Disobedience or deviation is punished publically by 
flogging and execution (Amnesty 2015b:1-6). Boko Haram-governance in 
controlled territories has the character of an extreme Islamic theocracy. Under 
Shekau´s leadership the movement has metamorphosed from an introvert, world 
renouncing sect to a transnational threat with over 280 000 members (Onuoha 
2010:58).1 Not only has Boko Haram expanded rapidly under Shekau, but close 
ties have been established with other jihadist movements such as AQIM2 and 
ISIS3, and Shekau is believed to be the driving force behind it. He has personally 
sworn allegiance to Al-Qaeda and ISIS, indicating that not only Nigeria and the 
African continent, but also western countries are targets (Gray & Adeakin 
2015:192-197, Simons 2015:7). Adding to that, medial presence of Boko Haram 
has increased significantly, Shekau taking center stage, providing messages and 
statements to African and western leaders. It is thus clear even from a cursory 
examination that Shekau is an essential actor in the context of Boko Haram, and 
in wider perspectives, the global jihadist movement. The purpose of this thesis is 
to examine Shekau as leader, studying his role in the construction and 
intermediation of jihadist-ideology through Boko Haram-media strategy. The 
approach includes theories of charismatic leadership and framing, and a 
functional-ideological holistic analysis of video-material, portraying Shekau. The 
thesis will examine his particular role in mediating/constructing jihadist 
ideological themes.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 Membership consisting mostly of poor and disaffected youths, unemployed, radical students, but also highly 
educated people such as politicians, university teachers, theologians, businessmen, and government officials 
supports Boko Haram, providing financial donations and training grounds (Adesoji 2010, Onuoha 2010:56-58, 
Simons 2015:42-53).  
2 Concerning acronyms I refer readers to the appendix.   
3 Thus effectively making Nigeria a province of the global jihadist caliphate, “rebranding itself as “Islamic State 
West Africa Province (ISWAP)”. (Comolli 2015b:109).  
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1.1 Stating the questions  
This thesis will try to answer two questions in regard to Shekau as leader of Boko 
Haram and his appearances in several videos:  
 
- What kind of jihadist-ideological themes does Shekau construct in his video 
messages?   
- In what sense do symbols and contexts in the video material construct an 
ideological framework in addition to Shekau´s teachings?  
 
1.2 Boko Haram in earlier research 
Onuoha (2010:55) stated that the origins of Boko Haram are “mired in 
controversy”. This statement could be equally valid for the whole subject of Boko 
Haram since many aspects concerning the movement still are shrouded in 
mystery. Much focus has been placed on understanding how and why people are 
being radicalized and joining them. The main hypothesis is that of socio-economic 
marginalization, where high rates of unemployment, illiteracy, poverty, crime and 
lack of education are radicalizing factors. Related to this view are also theories 
concerning ethnic and religious divides due to socio-economic marginalization 
and inequitable distribution of resources, mainly through Northern-Southern-
Nigeria dichotomies. Such views are represented by Onuoha, Sodipo (2013), 
Loimeier (2012), Eveslage (2013) and to some extent Comolli (2015a) who views 
the subject within the field of security-studies. Earlier research of these variants 
has focused on aspects pertaining to local, regional or national factors. An 
interesting contribution within the field is that of Simons (2015), who presents the 
hypothesis that Boko Haram has a deliberate agenda of keeping Nigeria a failed-
state through terrorism, establishing a culture of fear, thus weakening the state. 
Other scholars like Hill (2013) and Agai (2014) have sought to understand Boko 
Haram within the field of history, seeking patterns of earlier expressions of 
religious extremism in Nigeria. None, however, has focused on the perspective of 
charismatic leadership or construction of ideology as essential factors in Boko 
Haram-research. The only study, to my knowledge, on Boko Haram´s ideology is 
a recent one by Kassim (2015), which seeks to show that Boko Haram uses 
Nigerian historical expressions of jihad in connection with global Salafist 
doctrine. There ideological constructions are given some space, but focus is rather 
on doctrinal development between historical expressions of jihad than on 
constructions of ideology in present time.  Also, my study focuses solely on 
Shekau, whereas Kassim examines mostly earlier characters. This thesis can be 
seen as related to that of Kassim´s, but with other approaches, among others that 
of charismatic leadership and the use of a holistic method.  
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1.3 Relevance of this study for political science 
The research into religio-political terrorism is intimately connected to political 
science. The rapid expansion of Boko Haram on the African continent and its 
ongoing “internationalization” (Solomon 2015:87) points to the importance of 
ideological studies of particular expressions of jihadism, especially if we take into 
consideration the ongoing religio-political conflicts world-wide also fueled by 
jihadism.   
 
Kassim (2015:173-175) laments that analysis of Boko Haram´s ideology within 
academic disciplines is a virtual “terra incognita” and needs to be addressed. 
Thus, Kassim´s call for deeper studies is here answered.   
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2 Defining central concepts  
2.1 Terrorism 
The term terrorism is much debated regarding both contents and meaning and 
there is no academic consensus how to define it (Solomon 2015:2-7, Stepanova 
2008:5). This thesis will follow Stepanova´s concept of superterrorism. This 
terrorism is “by definition global or at least seeks global outreach and, as such, 
does not have to be tied to local or national contexts or armed conflicts.” It; 
 
“pursues existential, non-negotiable, global (…) unlimited goals – such as that of challenging 
and changing the entire world order, as in the case of al-Qaeda and the broader, post-al-Qaeda 
transnational violent Islamic movement.” (Stepanova 2008:10) 
 
This thesis regards Boko Haram as part of the GJM with goals transcending 
those of strictly local, regional or national ones.  
2.2 The Global jihadist movement (GJM) 
With GJM is meant a heterogeneous, multi-level, complex phenomenon which 
cannot be regarded as uniform, concerning structures or functions. Nor is it bound 
to specific geographical areas or cultures, even though it operates on local and 
national levels in all cultures. Rather, it is a “borderless social movement that 
survives and evolves via the internet” (Hayne 2010:62). GJM-actors are actors in 
multiple forms and varieties, often loosely associated (Schultz 2008:141). Since 
communications today are global, transcending local, regional and national 
borders via internet and modern ICT-technology, members from different parts of 
the world communicates with each other in real time. Also GJM is independent of 
conventional armies, military hierarchical structures and state-led organizations. 
Instead loyalties, boundaries and organizational structures are of fluid characters 
and operations takes place in clandestine and unpredictable environments. 
Narrowly defined, GJM has a network-character which often defies transparency 
and direct observations (Springer, Regens & Edger 2009:96-103). Even though 
GJM is not a centralized phenomenon, ideologues, sheiks, imams and leaders are 
unifying factors and important features of the movement (Brachman 2009:189). I 
define GJM as a global network-based social movement, identified not primarily 
by factors as nationality, ethnicity or cultures, but religio-ideological markers. 
This ideology is jihadism.  
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2.3 Global jihadism: a religio-political ideology 
In defining “ideology” I agree with Moghadam (2008:1-3) and Schultz (2008:136, 
cf. Bergström & Boréus 2012:140-141) that ideology is an “emotion-laden system 
of ideas, beliefs, myths, and values”. When discussing the ideological 
phenomenon of GJM, I use the term jihadism. The term, a modern neologism, is 
not connected to Islamic history or to the theological concept of jihad4, making it 
useful to capture the phenomenon of extremist Islam (Brachman 2009:4-5). The 
GJM and its religio-political ideology is Sunni-dominated and global in nature 
(Hill 2013:240, Turner 2014:11). The ideology “central” to the movement 
(Martinage 2008:12) is not only political, but also religious, since it uses religious 
codes and language taken from Islam. It presupposes the existence of God, has 
religious world-views, describing its perceived enemies in religious terms and 
justifies violence from selective interpretations of the Quran and Hadiths. It is 
“totalitarian” since it seeks to “mould Islamic religious tradition to serve narrow 
political ends of domination” (Solomon 2015:22). Ideology can also be described 
as having 4 functions; an explanatory explaining the world-view, a diagnostic 
pointing out perceived enemies, an identity-function providing self-conceptual 
images and identity to the adherents as belonging to a supranational community, 
and an action-based-function explaining in programmatic fashion how the 
adherents are to deal with perceived threats (Moghadam 2008:1-3). Scholars have 
identified common denominators, around which the ideology revolves.  
2.4 Doctrinal teachings of global jihadism  
1. True Islam is under attack by two types of enemies; apostate Muslim-
governments and the atheist/infidel non-Islamic Western world, portrayed 
foremost as the U.S and Europe.  
2. An apocalyptic struggle between forces of good and evil, those believing 
in God´s teachings and those opposing them. The jihadist world-view is 
strongly dualistic.  
3. The world-order must be changed through jihad to usher in the world-wide 
Islamic state often termed as “the Caliphate”, a projection of the first 
Islamic state/empire established by the Prophet Mohammad.  
4. The West is morally corrupt and decadent with its culture of atheism, 
separation of religion and state, sexual immorality and false religions.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
4 The concept of jihad has two meanings; an inner spiritual struggle towards one’s own sins and temptations, 
emphasizing personal purification, and a second emphasizing physical warfare for the defense of Islam or 
defense of Islamic territories (dar al-Islam). That second meaning developed over time and came to embrace an 
offensive interpretation, used by jihadists, where adherents has the right to impose Islam, by force if necessary, 
onto heathens or infidels (Hashmi 2004:377-379).  
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5. Dar al-Islam is occupied/colonized by western military forces with 
approval from corrupt Muslim-governments (e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan), 
traitors to their religion, due to their cooperation with the West.  
6. “Zionists” (Jews and Israelis), are trying to eradicate Islam from its Holy 
land collaborating with “Crusaders” (Christians), an image derived from 
medieval crusades, depicting colonialism, invasion and war.  
7. Sharia-law is the only legitimate, god-ordained way of constituting 
societies/states. Western democracies are man-made inventions, regardless 
of type (e.g. direct, representative, elite) opposed to God´s sovereignty. 
The same goes for Muslim-governments structured not in accordance with 
jihadist ideological interpretations; they have apostatized from true Islam 
(Brachman 2009:1-20, Schultz 2008:162-163, Martinage 2008:31-36, 
Qutb 2006), Springer, Regens & Edger 2009:4-8, 52-56, Turner 2014:52, 
142).  
2.5 Radicalization  
I agree with Onuoha (2014b:2-3) that radicalization is defined as “a process of 
rejection the status quo and often democratic ideals; adopting an extreme political, 
social, or religious ideology; and condoning violence as a means to achieving 
ideological goals:” This can take place in both individuals and in group-contexts.  
An individual or group goes in such processes from passivity to action, fueled by 
perceived grievances or crises, in local, national or international contexts. 
Gradually individuals/groups are being mobilized into adopting extremist views 
and become integrated into communities of like-minded people. In this digital age 
the internet has become a tool for radicalization and has a “radicalizing efficacy”. 
When discussing “the audience” of jihadist video-material we must confess with 
Awan (2007:399) that; “their efficacy in actual radicalization is extremely 
difficult to ascertain”. This Awan connects with audiences, we cannot know who 
they in reality are, or how radicalized every individual or group actually becomes. 
This is not the task of this thesis either, but rather radicalization is implicit in the 
understanding and explanatory aims of Shekau´s intermediate role. 
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3 Theoretical approach: Charismatic 
leadership 
The term was originally coined by sociologist Max Weber who developed it in 
relation to his concept of “legitimate domination”, which he defined as “the 
probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a 
group of persons”. Three principles of charismatic leadership can be summed up; 
 
1. That the charismatic person ”attracts followers to himself/herself as a 
leader due to personal attributes which he or she may contain.” 
2. “The followers recognize that the charismatic personality has attributes 
which they perceive as being genuine and therefore follow the charismatic 
leader with a sense of awe, hope and faith” Thus for Weber charisma is a 
relationship between leaders and followers (Eatwell 2006:143).  
3. The context “must be favorable, usually a society under great stress, for 
the acceptance of the charismatic personality as leader.” (Ingram 2006:3).  
 
 
Charismatic authority in a leader includes “skills, behaviors, performances, 
and talent displayed by an actor (…) pertinent to the arena in which he or she 
operates.” Such skills could be “rhetorical and speech ability, a flair for dramatic 
performances, star qualities, and appeal” (Balmas & Sheafer 2014:994). Another 
characteristic of charismatic leaders is that they must prove themselves to be 
“exceptional, and exceptional in a way that justifies their claims on the obedience 
and commitment of their followers” Charismatics often view their mission or 
tasks as “given by God” or being otherwise “sacred or part of fate”. As Turner 
states: “The key to charisma is precisely the ability to present oneself as the way, 
as the instrument, and to rise above (…) and command on the basis of one´s 
personal authority” (Turner 2011:82-85). Indeed, for Weber charisma is “a form 
of authority” (Barnes 1978:1). 
 
3.1 Transformative charisma phenomenon: TCP-
theory 
This thesis will apply the TCP-theory, developed by Australian jihadism-scholar 
Haroro Ingram, on the empirical data. Ingram developed Weber´s theories on 
charismatic leadership within the framework of Islamic socio-cultural realms, 
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sculpturing out four categories of outlooks that can be applied to both individuals 
and groups within given contexts. Ingram defines them as secularist, modernist, 
radical and militant. Thus Ingram acknowledges the wide spectrum of Islamic 
orientations that are prevalent within Islam’s religious/cultural world. Secularists 
believe Islam belongs strictly to the private sphere, denying it access to public 
arenas, political systems and institutions. Modernists believe that Islam is 
compatible with modern society, and should be part of politics and culture. They 
view Islam as compatible with democracy and capitalism. Radicals thinks Islam 
should dominate society, influencing and guiding politics, law, culture and 
societal life. They view secularism as non-compatible with Islam, but don’t 
condone violence as means of separating the two. Militants, on the other hand, 
believe that Islam must replace all other forms of government or political systems 
and violence is an integral part of establishing pure Islamic societies. In the 
process of individuals/groups moving towards militant views the charismatic 
leader plays a “pivotal role” (Ingram 2006:5-6). Concerning this Ingram speaks 
about the perceptions of crises within given contexts, where potential secularists, 
modernists or radicals can turn militant as the perceived crisis needs a political 
solution, even though the underlying dilemma is of religious nature. Thus, politics 
and religion, as in Islamic orientations, are intrinsically integrated. Religious 
terrorism is a process which is constructed over time, but the process needs 
catalysts fueling it. Charismatic religious leaders, “plays a catalytic role in the 
radicalization process by highlighting, accentuating or even creating the 
perception of crisis within an individual or group” (Ingram 2006:6). Ingram refers 
to the chain of charisma, focusing on the Islamic clerical tradition, which is not 
centralized or uniform. This openness in times of perceived crisis facilitates the 
arrival of charismatic imams, preachers and religious leaders who in turn build 
upon earlier leader´s “charisma, ideology and leadership qualities” Thus ideology 
and charisma are pivotal factors and perpetuates each other in complex ways 
relating to both history and current socio-cultural contexts, each charismatic 
building upon earlier constructing their own images (Ingram 2006:7-8).5 Not only 
images of themselves are constructed, but also the jihadist ideology evolves 
further with each new charismatic in his context.  
 
Ingram exemplifies with the emergence of the modern Islamic political 
movement which had its origins in Egypt during the 19th-century. The emergence 
of charismatic leaders as Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-
1935), modernists in the sense that they thought it possible to combine western 
ideologies with Islam, started the phenomenon of political Islam. As they died 
new charismatic leaders emerged who took the ideology of their predecessors and 
evolved it into more radical patterns, namely that western life-styles were 
incompatible with Islam and dichotomies were constructed.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
5 This reasoning highlights the importance not only of history within Jihadism, but also of how different jihadist 
leaders are standing in relation to each other, even though they belong to different parts of the GJM.  
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One such critically important charismatic was Hassan Al-Banna (1906-1949), 
founder of the Muslim Brotherhood-movement. An important aspect is that Al-
Banna came to embody the organization in his person and image and the 
organization evolved into a model for many Islamic terrorist-movements, as he 
became the spiritual father of Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), the very “father” of 
jihadist doctrine (Ingram 2006:8-11, cf. Brachman 2009:22-26, Martinage 
2008:13). Thus, men like Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri, strongly 
influenced by Qutb, militarized the ideology, and modern jihadism was born. It´s 
noteworthy that bin Laden in many instances pushed Islamic revivalism into the 
digital age, disseminating propaganda and educational material by “setting up a 
global distribution system”. After 1994 internet and e-mail became standard 
electronic means of reaching audiences everywhere (Bodansky 2001:101). Thus, 
radicalization of ideology has taken place in an evolutionary perspective.   
 
Taken together, these charismatic leaders within a spectrum of Islamic thought 
and doctrine develops jihadist-ideology in relation to new contexts, but always 
with historical developments integrated into the whole. What is essential is also 
that this theory contains aspects of framing, purposeful transmission and 
intermediation of ideology via charismatic leaders in new contexts, making the 
theory integrative and innovative.6 This theory can be fruitful in understanding 
constructions of jihadist ideology and the role of leaders within those contexts and 
their interaction in constructing jihadism.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
6 One must understand the missionary aspects of Islam, which are incorporated into the language and behavioral 
codes of Jihadist-ideology, seen as imperative that people are converted to the “true faith” in the ongoing 
apocalyptic struggle between good and evil (Martinage 2008:31). I define this as proselytism.  
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4 Method: Social-constructivist 
holistic approach 
This thesis adopts a social-constructivist-approach where ideas and actors such as 
individuals, groups and movements are connected to each other. In social-
constructivist academic tradition languages, actions, symbols, ideas7 and 
ideologies interact with actors forming the reality and the world. Thus, reality is 
not something that is “out there waiting to be discovered”, but rather something 
that is given meaning and purpose by and through actors. Reality is social by 
nature, constructed by actors and given meaning (Barnett 2014:156-161). 
Identities8 are therefore fundamentally important within this ontological tradition. 
Within functional-ideological methods ideas and ideologies are systematically 
studied, here in relation to texts. The meaning of “text” in academic study is broad 
and inclusive. Texts are often written documents but digital material such as 
movies, photographs and images also constitutes texts. Since much material today 
is internet-based the definition of “texts” needs to be expanded (Björkvall 
2012:307, Macnamara 2005:1). Languages, symbols and contexts are parts of an 
integrated whole, and they can be analyzed in accordance with their own 
premises, and be understood as complimentary parts of that complex whole 
(Macnamara 2005:15-17). Thus, I refer to a holistic analysis, not only of texts in 
the traditional understanding, but also of video-material featuring Shekau. 
Studying ideologies requires;  
 
“in-depth analysis of selected contents (…) required to fully understand the potential 
meanings (manifest and latent) for audiences and likely effects of texts” (Macnamara 2005:14) 
 
A visual textual analysis probes deeper into the world of ideology, where also 
actors are mediators of it, not only transmitting it further but also upholds its 
meanings. We note a circular relationship between ideology, context and actors. 
Since functional ideological-analytical method have at the same time descriptive 
and explanatory ambitions it is useful from social-constructivist approaches, as is 
the large amount of academic freedom attached to the method in defining it 
(Bergström & Boréus 2012:146-147).  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
7 Defined as constructions of thoughts defined by a certain stability and continuity, as notions of reality, 
valuations of events and conceptions of how one is to act (cf. Bergström & Boréus 2012:140).  
8 With “identity” is meant the individual/collective self-perception, which in turn is derived from group-
membership and the emotional belonging attached to it. The individual or group views itself from membership, 
thereby creating their identity, which is social, since it is produced through interactions. (Barnett 2014:159-166).  
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By emphasizing the visual aspects both manifest and latent ideology can be 
properly analyzed (Björkvall 2012:342-343, Macnamara 2005:2). Thus, both 
contextual events and language will be analyzed to capture the whole dimension 
of ideological transmission and construction. The analysis will be implemented 
through the methodical use of dimensions/categories, in order to systematize 
contents and analysis more coherently. The dimensions/categories have been 
structured after my investigation of the empirical data. Also here, as in the world 
of jihadist-ideology symbols are immensely important.  
4.1 Jihadi symbols and imagery: visual aspects of 
ideology 
The roles of symbols and imagery are equally fundamental parts of the jihadist 
universe. This comes from the fact that Jihadism is a religious ideology, deriving 
its language, imagery, actions and codes from Islam (Moghadam 2008). Concepts 
as jihad are religiously derived from the Quran and the Hadiths, reinterpreted by 
jihadists according to ideological belief-structures. Cook (2009) states that jihadist 
use of symbols and imagery in video material has increased, and that it is; “a 
prime vehicle for communications and the essential tool for the diffusion of 
jihadist ideals”. Several other scholars on jihadism, including Jarret Brachman, 
states that not only can symbols be seen as texts, but also that ideology is 
mediated through them. Symbols are; 
 
“(…) an essential tool utilized by radical ideologues, terrorist organizations, and sympathetic 
propagandists, which plays to the particular religious and cultural experiences of their audience.” 
(Brachman, Boudali & Ostovar 2006:5)  
 
Regarding internet in relation to the study of jihadism one must also bear in mind 
that it is the “principal platform for the dissemination and mediation of the culture 
and ideology of jihadism” (Awan 2007:390). Thus symbols and imagery within 
digital texts such as video material are important factors to consider in a holistic 
perspective concerning construction and mediation of jihadist ideology. 
 
 
4.2 Empirical data: critical discussion  
Several videos featuring Shekau will be used here for analysis. The use of video-
material is defensible with the lack of written sources from Boko Haram and 
especially Shekau himself in mind. The fact that he has been featured in several 
videos becomes vital for this investigation into the subject of ideological 
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constructions and intermediation. The purpose of a holistic analysis of language, 
symbols and imagery also allows this material to be used in such contexts as this. 
The data is collected mainly from a compiled set of translated video material by 
Benjamin Eveslage, a scholar in African and Oriental Studies. Eveslage´s study 
has a quantitative approach towards understanding Boko Haram´s expansionism 
by examining specifically coded words in Shekau´s and other spokesperson´s 
video-messages. From the quantitative investigations Eveslage concludes that 
Boko Haram´s threats are emphasizing the domestic contexts, although he doesn’t 
rule out Boko Haram´s capacity in making real their threats against the 
international community. Eveslage´s focus is thus on threat-assessment, and not 
ideological constructions or formations. In fact, ideology is only mentioned in 
passing here. I therefore conclude that Eveslage´s examination has no bearing on 
my thesis and my approaches, although it is valuable for an overall picture of 
Boko Haram´s threats against specific actors.  
 
His list consists of Boko Haram-statements from 2012, some by Shekau and 
others by spokespersons. This compiled set is of great value to this thesis, since it 
provides English translations of Shekau´s statements, which often are delivered in 
Hausa and Arabic. The data also shows that established scholars are using 
translations of such material, even though it is understandable to criticize all use 
of translations in general, since such use runs the risk of losing some aspects of 
the original language, and perhaps also underlying meanings of that language. But 
that risk is affordable in situations where access to Hausa and Arabic are limited, 
and also with the level of the thesis and its time-constraints in view. If established 
scholars are using translations then it´s certainly legitimate for an undergraduate-
thesis in the same context to use translations.   
 
Another fair criticism that can be put forward against these sources is the fact 
that we in some sense “fall into the hands of Shekau himself”, when investigating 
its contents. Certainly, one runs the risk of investigating here, perhaps, what 
Shekau wants us to investigate. But then again, it´s also my intention to actually 
sculpture out Shekau´s explicit views and statements in order to understand his 
position in ideological construction and formation. If Shekau, as my object of 
investigation, has a “hidden agenda”, I could not know of it, as could no one else 
either. As researchers we can never enter into the hearts and minds, so to speak, of 
our objects of study. Therefore both this thesis and other kinds of research are 
subjected to that kind of danger. Thus, a critical position and a critical awareness 
must be implemented along the process of research, to minimize such dangers, as 
scholars within textual critical methodology also states (cf. Bergström & Boréus 
2012:33-38).   
 
The individual videos used will be accounted for in the “Sources”-section at 
the end of the thesis, where links to the videos also will be accounted for. For 
those interested in more thorough study of the sources I refer them to Eveslage 
(2013) for easier access. Now, I will address the rise of Boko Haram and the 
ideological heritage its leaders have addressed and advocated.  
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5 Rise of Boko Haram: Ideology from 
Yusuf to Shekau  
Jama´atu Ahlis-Sunnah Lidda áwati Wal Jihad9 or Boko Haram10 has its roots in 
Islamic revivalist-and insurgency movements dating back to the 18th century.11 In 
2002 the group was founded by Muhammad Yusuf (1970-2009), the foundation 
being the result of theological controversy over how to relate to western 
influences in Nigeria. Yusuf rejected moderate imams, schools and the Nigerian 
secular democratic system as contrary to orthodox Islam.12 Yusuf also rejected 
Darwinism taught in schools as anti-Islamic and was considered “a charismatic 
speaker” with “oratory prowess” that preached an austere life and seclusion from 
the corrupt society. Yusuf was influenced by the Taliban-movement in 
Afghanistan and saw Boko Haram as the Nigerian version of the Taliban. But 
Yusuf´s admiration for the Taliban was double-edged; he was inspired by their 
fight for a Sharia-state, but regarded their ideology too extreme (Adesoji 2010, 
Onuoha 2010). This indicates distance between Yusuf and Shekau concerning 
ideological formation and levels of radicalization. Shekau leans towards al-Qaeda-
affiliates and ISIS, and Yusuf adhered to more localized expressions of ideology, 
influenced by national and tribal factors such as the Taliban (Frear 2012). 
 
As membership increased the group took up arms against the authorities in 2003 
attacking police stations and governmental institutions. The goal was to turn 
Nigeria into a Sharia-governed Islamic state. When Boko Haram provoked major 
uprisings in several federal states in 2009, full-scale assaults on the sect ensued by 
government forces ordered by President Goodluck Jonathan, leading to the extra-
judicial killing of Yusuf. Over 1000 people were killed, mainly sect-members, and 
hundreds were arrested.  The sect was believed to have been defeated but it 
resurfaced under the leadership of Shekau, Yusuf’s second-in-command. The 
insurgency escalated with frequent attacks on government institutions, police 
stations, military installations, prisons, schools, markets, churches and mosques. 
The movement gained international notoriety attacking the UN-headquarters in 
Abuja in 2011 and with the kidnappings of 276 school-girls from Chibok in 2014.  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
9 “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet´s Teachings and Jihad” 
10 Often translated “Western Education is forbidden/sinful”. The movement denounces this name, since it views 
western cultures sinful, not only education (Cook 2011:13-14).  
11 Presentation based on Comolli 2015, Cook 2011, Loimeier 2012, Onuohoa 2010, Onuohoa 2012, Onuohoa 
2014, Simons 2015 and Pérouse de Montclos 2015.  
12 “The constitution is a lie, it is kufr, Democracy is a lie; it is kufr” (Yusuf quoted in Kassim 2015:189).  
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5.1 Shekau: paradoxical, mythical and radical leader 
Shekau himself seems to be a man of contradictions, paradoxes and mystery, 
reinforced by the fact that not much is known about him. He was born in Nigeria 
and after having been schooled by a traditional cleric he went to university-studies 
in theology and became an educated imam, considered even a specialist in Islamic 
doctrine. Witnesses portrayed Shekau as “dedicated” and intelligent, but also 
highly radical and extreme in his theological position, something confirmed by his 
sermons working as imam in a Maiduguri mosque. He knew Yusuf as a student 
and joined him early on since they shared radical Salafist views. But compared to 
Yusuf, Shekau is a “hard-liner” and harsh decision-maker in matters concerning 
the collective movement. Shekau even accused Yusuf, when alive, for being too 
“liberal” (Comolli 2015a:60-61). He is described by Nigerian experts as that of a 
“fearless loner, a complex, paradoxical man – part-theologian, part-gangster” A 
Nigerian journalist with deep insights into Boko Haram claims Shekau has “an 
intense ideological commitment and ruthlessness” Also he is said to have a 
“photographic memory” and is “well-versed in theology” (BBC 2014). Shekau 
has been pronounced dead several times by Nigerian authorities, but has always 
resurfaced. These events have shaped the image of Shekau as a mythical leader, 
being almost immortal. However, Shekau´s leadership has not been uncontested; 
Ansaru, a splinter-group, has left Boko Haram, questioning Shekau´s views of 
killing Muslims, regarding him as too severe and extreme (Onuoha 2013). Under 
Shekau´s leadership Boko Haram has transformed from a revivalist-sect with 
regional implications to a transnational threat, operating in Chad, Niger, 
Cameroon, Mali, Somalia, Sudan and probably CAR. Organizational ties have 
been established to Al-Qaeda-affiliates, Al-Shabaab and ISIS. He has even 
married Yusuf´s widow and adopted his children (Comolli 2015). 
5.2 Boko Haram media strategy 
According to Awan (2007:392) many internet-forums such as social media, blogs 
and webpages have the goal of “promulgation of jihadism” and is a fundamental 
part of GJM to disseminate its teachings and doctrines online, thus providing 
opportunities for proselytism (Bockstette 2008:13-19, Hayne 2010:62). Since 
Boko Haram joined ISIS it has become “a key member of a wider pan-jihadist 
network” (Gray & Adeakin 2015:196), thereby becoming part of ISIS aggressive 
media-strategy to proselytize and invoke fear into enemies. Simons (2015:53-57) 
states that Boko Haram sees internet and YouTube as invaluable means in a 
“propaganda effort” to publicize their acts and intentions, thus providing evidence 
that they have implemented a media-strategy in order to achieve their goals. We 
will have this in mind in the analysis.  
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6 Analysis    
6.1 Shekau, leadership and embodiment of ideology 
In a video released in September, 2013 Shekau appeared after having been 
reported dead by Nigerian authorities, and Comolli (2015a:62-62) aptly stated that 
she was “very skeptical” when such messages were delivered to the press. 
Nigerian military sources have declared Shekau dead multiple times and yet he 
has always resurfaced, establishing images of them as powerless, incompetent 
liars. Such events cannot be underestimated because they are essential in 
providing Shekau with authority13, and a position of power in jihadist circles. As 
scholarship shows, leaders are actors essential for cohesion, loyalty and obedience 
within jihadist movements and in the radicalization process (Ingram 2006:6). 
Terrorism is a multi-causal phenomenon not driven by one single factor, but by 
many interacting ones. Within jihadist terrorism, leaders are dominating actors 
even though planning and execution of terrorist-acts gets delegated to 
subordinates. For religious terrorism the causal effect of justifying one´s acts is 
inherent into the phenomenon itself, the religio-ideological system justifies 
terrorist-acts, implementing a transcendent/theological dimension, by asserting 
that God justifies and makes terrorist-acts “sacred” (Underhill 2014:9-10). Thus, 
decisions and orders from leaders in such environments are crucial, constructing 
the leader´s position. Therefore it is important for Shekau to use his public 
appearances to strengthen his position and legitimization. They constitute 
platforms for dissemination of ideology. In a video from 2012 we meet not only a 
propaganda-video, but statements from Shekau directed to all the worlds’ jihadist-
fighters and a display of Boko Haram´s power as a fighting force. Most of the 
compiled video-footage is of Shekau commanding his troops in military drills and 
shooting exercises. Jihadists are in a desert landscape with assault-rifles and 
machineguns firing them on targets not visible, accompanied by Shekau´s 
commanding voice, giving directives, echoing the jihadist war-cry “Allahu 
akbar”, something deeply ideological. Shekau is seen shooting and still-footage of 
him are interspersed throughout. All this is framed to show that Shekau is a 
fighting leader, not a bystander. Such footage constructs the image of Shekau as 
one who fights with his men, not as one only commanding others to execute jihad. 
The image is one of an active fearless leader; who shares the hardships of jihad 
with his soldiers, not one who hides. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
13 Understood in the terms of Weber´s “legitimate domination”.  
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The context is reinforced by Arabic religious music playing in the background and 
the picture of the Quran in the upper-corner which gives religious legitimacy to 
the group and the events. The Quran symbolizes the “correct belief-system” and 
also admonishes Muslims to keep their religious duties, here, jihad (Brachman, 
Boudali & Ostovar 2006:92). Shekau invokes traditional chants glorifying God, 
and then invokes blessings onto the audience. We have here an important aspect 
of Shekau´s leadership, as imam, having religious authority preaching God´s 
words and will, making him not an ordinary military/worldly leader; but can be 
perceived in jihadi contexts as a spokesman for God. Within Sunni-Islam imams 
are leaders connected to authority, being personifying examples for others to 
follow (Zaman 2004:349-350). This enhances Shekau´s charismatic abilities as an 
agitator, giving him authority and at the same time providing impressions of 
humility as he joins his men in jihad, pointing out that he is only a poor servant of 
God. Such rhetoric strengthens his leadership. Jihad is the pervading theme and 
Shekau says;  
 
“The religion is victorious until the Day of Judgment, and its support is an obligatory duty 
(…) O mujahideen brothers this is a proof that our jihad is a jihad in the Cause of Allah because it 
is impossible that we kill everyday and not get killed” (Shekau 2012-11-29) 
 
Shekau frames jihad as obligatory, because it has its grounds in God himself 
and will be victorious for all earthly time until God judges the world. 
“Mujahideen” is an honorary title as righteous soldiers of God and Shekau 
bestows this title on the watching jihadists. This frames the whole legitimizing 
context of jihad as divine and mandatory, but also gives the audience the 
impression of being chosen by God for a cause greater than themselves, namely 
jihad.  This righteous cause is confirmed by the fact that they can kill their 
enemies and survive themselves, divine approval according to Shekau, thereby 
giving further legitimization of jihad. God is constantly used as frame of reference 
and legitimization, as are quotations of selected Quran-texts to fit into a modern 
conception of a crisis situation.  According to TCP-theory perceptions of crises 
are important in constructing ideology with the charismatic leader as an important 
component in that process. Shekau (2012-11-29) frames the nature of the crisis;   
 
“The world should witness, and America, Britain, Nigeria and other Crusaders (…) and the 
Jews of Israel who are killing the Muslims in Palestine should witness, and the idolaters should 
witness, and the apostates and the hypocrites (…) that we are with our mujahideen brothers in the 
cause of Allah everywhere, those who did their best to raise high the words of Allah and helped 
the weak Muslims who are humiliated by the Jews and the Crusader Christians…” 
 
Interestingly, Shekau exemplifies with Palestine as a crisis point, where 
Muslims are killed and abused not only by Jews and Christians, but by apostate 
Muslims who are hypocrites, a common name for perceived traitorous Muslims, 
helping “idolaters”, another derogatory name for non-Muslims. America, Britain 
and Nigeria are equaled to “Crusaders” thereby providing global dimensions to 
the crisis-point. But Palestine is not the center of attention overall for Shekau; the 
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crisis is global, which Shekau reiterates throughout his speech, pointing to an 
international context. Muslims suffers everywhere at the hands of Jews and 
Christians. But he brings “glad tidings” to the oppressed in a global perspective;  
 
“We are with our mujahideen brothers in the cause of Allah everywhere, in Afghanistan, 
Chechnya, Pakistan, Kashmir, Iraq, the peninsula of Muhammad (…) Yemen, Somalia, Algeria, 
and other places I didn’t mention” (Shekau 2012-11-29). 
 
Shekau frames dar al-Islam as globally invaded territory, thereby hinting at 
the jihadist-ideological notion of it as occupied by oppressors. But he consoles the 
suffering brothers in jihad, telling them that their struggle is divinely willed and 
that the Nigerian jihadists are supporting them with constant prayers day and night 
(Shekau 2012-11-29). Thus, Shekau frames a global brotherhood, a bond 
transcending national borders, which is another jihadist-ideological theme, that 
participants are brothers. A jihadist-identity is being framed by Shekau, with 
global extent. One very important aspect of Shekau´s leadership is that he is 
heavily influenced by especially bin Laden, and Usman Dan Fodio (1754-1817), a 
“highly revered” preacher, considered as the founder of jihadism in Nigeria, who 
waged jihad in 1804 and established a caliphate. He´s considered an “ideological 
inspiration” for many jihadists and radicals in Nigeria today (Comolli 2015a:13-
16, Kassim 2015). Dan Fodio´s jihad was based on several factors; religious 
(spreading Islam as the only genuine religion), political (over-throwing rulers 
viewed as illegitimate) and socio-economical (calling for fair distribution of 
resources to the poor and reformed laws) (Agai 2014:67-70). Dan Fodio was 
regarded as charismatic, drawing large crowds to his teachings and jihad, but the 
context was the immediate local one, not global jihad. His jihad had a more tribal-
oriented character, something Shekau seems to disregard. According to TCP-
theory charismatics build upon predecessors, taking some of their aspects and 
teachings, developing and radicalizing them. Shekau refers to him in another 
video (2015-02-18) addressing African Muslim leaders; 
 
“(…) even some of your Religious scholars did not remember or think how the kingdom of 
Shaikh Usman ibn Fodio was, and how he ruled his land by following the Quran”  
 
Dan Fodio is presented as an example of godliness, leading his caliphate on 
the basis of the Quran, thus framing current Muslim leaders as his opposites. 
Shekau connects history to his own leadership, but takes it further ideologically. 
Shekau´s admiration of bin Laden and al-Qaeda has earned him the nickname 
“The Osama bin Laden of Northern Nigeria” (Simons 2015:99) and the tying of 
bonds with AQIM and AQAP are important aspects of Shekau´s views of jihadist-
ideology. Regarding Shekau´s leadership we see that he continually address 
himself as “sheikh” and “imam” constructing his own position and exerting 
authority over jihadists, even claiming that God speaks to him personally (Shekau 
2012-01-11). In effect, Shekau is constructing himself as jihadist-ideology by 
embodying piousness (prayers, Quran-citings), action, fearlessness, former leaders 
in new contexts (crisis-points) thus embodying jihad itself.  
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6.2 Shekau and the war against apostate Muslim 
states and leaders  
Before the Nigerian elections in March, 2015 violence escalated between Boko 
Haram and JMTF. By now, Boko Haram had become a transnational threat 
reaching into Cameroon, Niger and Chad. Before the presidential election Shekau 
appeared in a video attacking and threatening Muslim national leaders. He 
addresses several issues concerning Muslims and the picture of war emerges. 
Let´s approach the visual context first. Shekau presents himself dressed in 
traditional clerical attire, highlighting his status as imam and Boko Haram´s 
spiritual leader. In his lap he has an AK47 and beside him a machinegun, weapons 
representing jihad as means of conquering enemies and religious war. Shekau sits 
on a green flag, representing the Prophet Muhammad and the advancement of 
Islam, with connotations to history and genealogy (Brachman, Boudali & Ostovar 
2006:58, 97). In that sense Shekau points to his succession as legitimate imam in 
the line of the Prophet, thereby promoting jihad as ideology and providing 
historical legitimacy before the audience. In the upper-right corner we 
interchangeably see al-raya, the black flag of ISIS containing the shahada14 and 
Jama´atu Ahlis-Sunnah Lidda áwati Wal Jihad in golden Arabic letters. This 
frames the connection and loyalty to ISIS, delivering powerful ideological 
statements to the audience. It presents Boko Haram as part of ISIS and therefore 
part of global jihad, not restricted to local or regional jihad-campaigns as those 
under Dan Fodio or Yusuf. Clearly, Shekau has radicalized the teachings of his 
predecessors. In this video his charismatic personality appears; Shekau´s manner 
of speaking reminds of Adolf Hitler, by scholars regarded as strongly charismatic; 
the pitch of Shekau´s voice goes up and down, pausing after having lashed out on 
perceived enemies. His eyes are intensely staring into the camera, as he speaks 
sometimes calmly smiling, yet authoritatively, suddenly raising his voice loudly in 
anger. At times he suddenly laughs scornfully, yet keeping his intense personality 
focused on the camera and the message. He radiates nonchalant confidence and 
rhetorical boldness, charismatic traits Hitler also possessed, which establishes 
bonds between listeners/observers and the leader (Eatwell 2006:141-142). 
Shekau´s strong personality in combination with his position as imam having 
religious authority, he constructs a crisis-point in a jihadist context;  
 
“All of you had created a constitution that is organized with numbers and pages, and you 
established it as a rule of your government. And you made the people to follow it, you made them 
follow it by force, you made them fear your aircrafts, and you jailed whoever that opposes you.  
(…) And now you are following and listening to Francois Hollande and you are imposing the 
rule of French people, and after all of that who allowed you to make some people disbelievers?” 
(Shekau 2015-02-18)  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
14 The Islamic confession of faith, itself an essential ideological symbol within jihadism.  
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Shekau here constructs distinct features of jihadist ideology; the Muslim leaders 
addressed are framed as traitors collaborating with western oppressors, here 
embodied by France and Hollande. Shekau probably has the French intervention 
against jihadists in Mali or CAR (cf. Comolli 2015:94-95) in mind, which he 
regards as infidel colonialist assaults on jihadist brothers, eagerly aided by 
apostate Muslim leaders in Nigeria, Cameroon, Benin, Niger and Chad. But there 
is more; Shekau talks about constitutions in these African countries, which are 
founded on secularist principles, the “numbers and pages” clearly referencing all 
that which is against the only legitimate state-constitution; the Quran.15 Secular 
laws, especially in Muslim lands are considered “major unbelief” by jihadists and 
amounts to polytheism16 (Kassim 2015:178, 185)) and Shekau confirms this 
ideological doctrine. Naming France is not a coincidence either; the French 
principle of laícité, strict separation between religion, public space and 
governance is essential here. Media have reported that many French Muslims 
believe themselves to be discriminated against, because of laícité, where religious 
public expressions and symbols are forbidden (Cornish 2015). In jihadist 
interpretation these are attempts by godless states at eradicating Islam and 
persecuting believers. Shekau says that African states are effectively in the hands 
of France, and the French hatred of true religion abides also within these African 
nations.17 The mentioning of “aircraft” is symbolic of western modern weaponry 
used to combat jihadists. “Jail” represents wrongful incarceration of believers 
protesting apostate governments and western presence as well as Boko Haram-
members arrested. The jihadist images of persecution and colonization appears in 
Shekau´s constructions; Muslim African leaders and France are collaborating in 
persecuting believers. They are therefore God´s enemies. Shekau explains why 
secular democracy is prohibited; 
 
“Everyone knows that democracy and the constitution is paganism and everyone knows there 
are some things that God has forbidden in the Quran that cannot be counted even western 
education!” (Shekau 2012:01-11)  
 
Democracy as governance, and constitutions based on that principle, amounts 
to paganism, rule and law separated from God´s sovereignty, making it man-made 
governance which in jihadist interpretations represent corruption, decadence and 
willful rebellion against God (Kassim 2015:188). The international system and 
modern nation states are aberrations for jihadists, who seek to build a 
supranational community under God´s sovereignty (Turner 2014:38). Shekau 
states that Muslim apostates are subjugating believers with “French rule”, 
secularism, turning people into “disbelievers”. Shekau most probably refers to 
Muslims accepting secular governance in African states, effectively turning them 
into believing in a false man-made system, and not in God´s constitutions.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
15 Yusuf also rejected the Nigerian constitution explicitly (Onuoha 2010:56).   
16 Since obeying such rulers and constitutions is equaled with worship of them as authorities, i.e. “gods”.  
17 Implying continued French colonization of Africa.  
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Implicitly the masses themselves are not primary villains although culpable, 
but the apostate governments transforming them into disbelievers, secularizing 
them. Shekau issues severe threats raising his voice aggressively pointing his 
finger at the camera, turning scornfully superior;  
 
“Do you think in this way you will be safe in the Grave? O Rulers of Africa! And you claim 
that you are Muslim! O you Mahamadou Issoufou President of Niger. O you Idriss Déby President 
of Chad. Don’t you see Jonathan, how he has failed in the fight against us. Do you think that you 
came to fight Jamaát Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da´wah wa´l-jihad? Take off the masks from your faces, 
and you must know that you fighting Allah (…) And it will be hard for you, because we fight with 
the guidance of Allah, we are not proud of our forces and our numbers. (Shekau 2015-02-18) 
 
Shekau portrays an ideological war and clash; between jihadism under God 
and secularism under apostate leaders, personified by Jonathan, Issoufou and 
Déby, leaders that jointly set up JMTF to combat Boko Haram´s transnational 
agenda. Intelligence exchange is also a vital component between Niger, Chad and 
Cameroon since it became known that Boko Haram runs “an international 
network of recruiting, training and indoctrination camps” in the respective 
countries. The cross-borders attacks are also having destabilizing effects which 
the leaders hope that JMTF will reverse (Onuoha 2014:6-7). But the African 
leaders are depending on large armies and numbers, secular things, but to no avail 
Shekau taunts, because they are in reality fighting against God. Shekau infer that 
Boko Haram has divine protection in the struggle against apostates. Shekau´s 
rhetoric is strong, provocative and fearful. Not even in their graves will the 
apostates be safe, a statement referring to Boko Haram´s (or God´s) anger against 
their countries, or perhaps referring to an eschatological punishment after death 
for apostasy. Indeed, Shekau views Boko Haram´s mission not as “evil”, but 
good, stating to Jonathan;  
 
We have stopped everything apart from saying we should stay on the path of truth and peace 
and live right in the sight of God. There, we will have peace and that is what we have been 
preaching and because of that they said we should be killed and our mosques destroyed. We 
decided to defend ourselves (…) That is why Jonathan (…) this is beyond your power. It is not our 
doing but that of God. (Shekau 2012-01-11).  
 
Shekau constructs an ideological picture of Boko Haram as victims of secular 
oppression, symbolized by Jonathan and Nigerian military forces. Boko Haram 
members are not evil, but try to preach the truth to people; they have abstained of 
everything except God´s truth, indicating compromises. But instead Nigerian 
forces kill and destroy their holy places of worship. Therefore, Shekau says, Boko 
Haram could only resort to self-defense. In that sense jihadism is also presented 
by Shekau as an ideology, promoting only truth and peace. But in the end God´s 
decisions will prevail, and Jonathan is powerless. Shekau have constructed deep 
crisis-points to the audience; Muslims are persecuted, oppressed and killed, their 
sanctuaries destroyed by apostates calling themselves Muslims, but are not. They 
are in the hands of more sinister forces; Christian western powers.  
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6.3 Shekau and the Christian agenda of dominance 
and destruction  
Much focus has centered on Boko Haram´s attacks on schools and societal 
institutions representing western education and culture, something which can only 
partly explain the complex phenomenon. For Shekau there are greater movements 
of destructive forces behind, which cannot be reduced to western secular influence 
on African/Nigerian schools, even though that is part of it. We have treated 
Shekau´s constructions of Muslim apostates; they are part of greater underlying 
forces. The implementation of democracy, supported by Muslim leaders, is only a 
tool used to achieve domination; the goal is the very destruction of Islam. The 
forces behind are both historical and present-day phenomena; namely Judaism, 
Christianity and western atheism. By them Muslims are held in jahiliyya, a state 
of decadence and religious ignorance (Qutb 2006:11-12). The GJM-ideology is 
universal and so is the battlefield (Schultz 2008:48-49). This we must bear in 
mind studying Shekau´s constructions of ideology. Shekau names “Jews” and 
“Crusaders” as forces oppressing and killing Muslims in Palestine, an essential 
conflict for jihadists since Jerusalem is the third holiest site in Islam (Springer, 
Regens & Edger 2009:51). Christians have been targeted by Boko Haram on 
several occasions, often in connection with international events such as the 
caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad in Denmark or western interference in 
Middle Eastern affairs, showing that Christianity and the West are viewed as 
interconnected. Also Igbos, an ethnic group including many Christians, are 
attacked in connection with such events, perceived as connected ethnically with 
Israel and stereotyped as “Jews of Africa” (Simons 2015:73-79).  
 
     Shekau appeared in a 2012 video addressed specifically to Jonathan and the 
President of CAN. Shekau appears dressed in white clerical attire, but also in a 
bullet-proof camouflage vest, signifying war. Beside him are AK47s, and behind 
him a green wall in leopard-spotted pattern sometimes seen on book-covers of the 
Quran. The color green is always connected to Islam and even if it appears 
insignificant it is not. Green coloring is “significant to all sectors of the Islamic 
world” and is “an overtly political and explicitly Islamic statement” (Brachman, 
Boudali & Ostovar 2006:107). Shekau appears showing off features of both his 
roles; the spiritual/clerical, and the military/worldly, indicating that he in person 
embodies jihad, which includes both spiritual and worldly applications. He talks 
here in a more restraint manner than otherwise, but not without his personal 
intensity. Especially Christians are attacked by Shekau, including Jonathan, a 
Christian, and therefore unfit to lead Nigeria. Remarkably, Shekau here constructs 
an odd image of Christians, portraying them as historical enemies of Islam, active 
also now in present time;  
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“We hardly touch anybody except security personnel and Christians and those who have 
betrayed us. Everyone knows what Christians did to Muslims, not once or twice. (…) Everyone 
knows what happened to our leader. Everyone knows what wickedness was meted out to our 
members and fellow Muslims in Nigeria… (Shekau 2012-01-11). 
 
Shekau again portrays Boko Haram as victims of oppressing forces, namely 
Christians represented by Jonathan, military forces and traitorous Muslims 
cooperating with them. Shekau repeats “everyone knows” thus framing what he 
says as facts, and not private views. Boko Haram doesn’t attack innocent people, 
but only those oppressing them and their collaborators indicating self-defense. 
Jonathan and his Christian oppressing government killed Yusuf and metes out 
“wickedness” against Boko Haram-members and believing Muslims. Boko Haram 
equals victims, Jonathan and Christians equals oppressors.18 Shekau frames a 
religio-political system of persecution behind all events, thereby giving flesh to 
jihadist-ideological notions of persecution by non-Muslims, aided by Muslim 
collaborators. This God knew would happen; 
 
“Before God created the earth, he knew what was going to happen and he has promised in the 
holy book that he will help his religion. It is beyond your power. What you see has been 
happening, God allowed it because you have refused to follow him and you have betrayed his 
religion. That is why, Jonathan, this is beyond your power-yes!” (Shekau 2012-01-11). 
 
The perspective provided is all-encompassing, God is sovereign and knows 
everything beforehand and therefore established his religion to counter men like 
Jonathan and his cronies. Boko Haram´s insurgency is therefore a result of God´s 
providence, because Jonathan has betrayed God by not converting to Islam and 
for persecuting righteous believers. Shekau´s words on what Christians have done 
to Muslims can be interpreted in two ways; historical or present-day events. It can 
also refer to both, with historicity implicitly understood, referring to either the 
Crusades as examples of Christian colonialism, or to Jonathan´s Christian 
government. The reference to Jonathan´s “power-yes” is odd. I believe it to be 
references to democracy as governance, which Jonathan represents, implying the 
power gained from the people´s consent, their “yes” to persecute Boko Haram. 
We have seen that Shekau denounces democracy as paganism, and we get further 
clues as Shekau attacks Christianity;  
 
“You Christians should know that Jesus is a servant and prophet of God. He is not the son of 
God. This religion of Christianity you are practicing is not a religion of God – it is paganism. God 
frowns at it. (…) Aside that, you Christians cheated and killed us to the extent of eating our flesh 
like cannibals! You did all you wanted to us. We are trying to coerce you to embrace Islam, 
because that is what God instructed us to do. Even at that, without provocation, you slaughtered us 
and took our wives and humiliated us!  Now you CAN president, you come out to say your people 
should come out and do whatever they want do!” (Shekau 2012-01-11) 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
18 Thus, Yusuf was killed by Christians rather than by government forces, according to Shekau´s argumentation.  
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The image constructed is of fundamental conflicts between what Shekau 
presents as righteous beliefs versus false ones. Democracy is denounced as 
paganism, and so is Christianity. They are therefore parts of the same oppressing 
system. In Islamic theological understanding Jesus is a prophet, and Christians are 
thereby regarded as pagans, worshipping a man. But Shekau not only presents 
common misunderstandings of Christianity, he provides bizarre theories 
concerning Christians as “cannibals” eating Muslim´s flesh. This could be 
propaganda aimed at stirring Muslim masses against Christians, spreading false 
rumors.19 But it could also be genuine beliefs that such things happen. Simons 
(2015) explains that conspiracy-theories abound in Nigeria, often connected to 
Boko Haram. If Shekau believes this, it would certainly confirm his view of 
Christians as pagans, being cannibals. Additionally, Christians supposedly took 
wives of Boko Haram-members, thereby humiliating them, without 
“provocation”. Many female Boko Haram-members have been arrested, and 
Shekau might be referencing such women, although it is not entirely clear.20 The 
overall ideological construction is clear nonetheless, Christians in power-positions 
are persecuting Muslims, and Boko Haram-members are victims, because they are 
trying to convert Christians and instead gets “slaughtered”. CAN is as an enemy, 
its president alongside Jonathan, are power-players persecuting Muslims.21 Thus, 
the construction of collaborations between Christians in a national association and 
Christians in the government as persecutors becomes clear.  
6.4 Shekau and the global conspiracy of atheistic 
democracy  
Finally, Shekau portrays the overarching enemy of jihadism; atheism as an all-
encompassing conspiracy. This conspiracy is global because its advocates and 
supporters are everywhere and their weapon is democracy; 
 
“(…) that came from America, France, Italy, Germany, Russia and the United Atheists, yes I 
call them atheists…” (Shekau 2015:02-18) 
 
The mentioned nations are atheist powers bent on Islam´s destruction, by 
furthering world-wide democracy, reinforcing jihadist interpretations of great 
conspiracies. Shekau´s derogatory name for the UN mirrors his views of it; a man-
made coalition of atheistic democracies, allied against Islam.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
19 Boko Haram has spread such views in printed pamphlets in the city of Kano, which could be expressions of 
such propaganda-tactics (Eveslage 2013:4).  
20 Women have taken on more active participation within Boko Haram as suicide-bombers and recruiters, and 
have been arrested in numbers by the authorities (BBC 2014-06-04).   
21 An ideological construction held also by Yusuf (Kassim 2015:190), showing that Shekau stands ideologically 
also on Yusuf´s teachings, something confirmed by TCP-theory.  
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Shekau´s view of it might have been the reason for Boko Haram attacking the 
UN-headquarters in Abuja in 2011, thus being perceived as an attack against 
globally allied enemies. The mentioned nations are all, regardless of west or east, 
non-Islamic and ancient Christian territories. Shekau´s thought seems consistent 
with the jihadist-ideological notion that “global atheism” is a force ruling the 
world (Martinage 2008:41), but he clearly singles out the UN as a central atheistic 
actor here. Shekau clearly connects these nations as the powers behind the 
Nigerian elections and he swears that they will; “not happen in peace, even if that 
cost us our lives”. God will not permit democratic elections to take place; 
 
“because you are saying that Authority is from people to people, which means that people 
should rule each other but Allah says that the Authority is only to him” (Shekau 2015-02-18) 
 
The jihadist interpretation of democracy as pure man-made rule is contrary to 
God´s sovereignty and therefore atheistic, because it does not consider God´s 
authority. Shekau states that those who believe in democracy are disbelievers, 
deniers of God. The ideology presented is that of man-made systems from mainly 
the Christian West, versus God´s sovereignty. Shekau is clearly hateful discussing 
it, speaking in a dark sinister voice mediating those feelings to the audience via 
his religious authority pointing his finger repeatedly and aggressively, marking 
every word. The presentation of a crisis-point is obvious. Behind such things are 
nations exerting their influence not only via democracy, but by killing jihadist 
leaders, hoping to scatter believers. Shekau (2012-11-09) lashes out; 
 
“O Britain, America, Israel and Nigeria: Don’t think that jihad stops with the deaths of imams, 
because imams are individuals. Jihad started now, jihad started now, O enemies of Allah. (…) Did 
jihad stop?! Did jihad stop?! No, a thousand no´s, a thousand no´s! (…) O disbelievers, O 
Apostates, O hypocrites, die from your frustration!” 
 
Abovementioned categories are joined together in this agenda, but will not 
succeed because leaders, even though important, are but tools of God who rules 
everything. Shekau once again turns to humility in his raging anger; he is but an 
instrument that can be killed, but jihad will always continue. The ideological 
construction is that jihad will continue regardless of how many imams are killed 
by the mentioned nations, images of democracies against everything Shekau 
stands for. The main ideological thought is of jihadism against democracies 
represented by Jews (Israel), Christians (Britain, America, Nigeria) and Muslims 
(Nigeria). The perpetuation of jihad is thus a central thought in Shekau´s 
ideological constructions throughout, explicitly and implicitly. Shekau´s 
charismatic outlook reinforces the message outlined; his extravagant flair for 
spectacular behavior, ferociousness, intensity and dedication to the cause conveys 
images of a leader jihadists can depend on. As Barnes (1978:4) aptly stated; 
charismatic leaders have the ability to provide answers in times of crisis. We will 
now address the conclusions.  
  26
7 Conclusions  
Shekau, viewed through TCP-theory, clearly constructs different jihadist-
ideological themes that pervade his video-messages. Viewed holistically a 
coherent ideological system is constructed, containing several key themes, 
constantly interacting.  
 
One such theme is that of Islam and jihadists as persecuted by oppressing powers, 
singled out by Shekau as apostate Muslim leaders, Christian leaders and secular 
western nations, particularly France and the U.S. The UN is also singled out as an 
atheistic system of nation-states using secular democracy as a weapon against 
Islamic nations and believers in order to persecute and dominate them.  
 
Another pervading theme constructed by Shekau is Christians as enemies, 
pointing to Christian political dominance within Nigeria via President Jonathan, 
and CAN as Christian-organized persecution of Muslims. Historical images of 
Christian crusades are implicit in Shekau´s construction of jihadist-ideology and 
Christianity is referenced as connected to the West. Shekau gives voice to peculiar 
conspiracy-theories of Christians, which are interwoven into the ideological 
constructions of them as ruthless enemies. Muslim leaders are treated specifically, 
again in relation to the theme of persecution, and they are constructed as 
collaborating with Christians and western governments. The theme of 
colonization is also prevalent, both explicit and implicit, and connected equally to 
Christianity and to the West. Shekau, as a charismatic and influential leader with 
both religious and worldly authority, even constructs himself as part and parcel of 
jihadist-ideology by embodying jihad in various aspects and claiming to be 
spokesperson for God. By standing on the authority of bin Laden via allegiance to 
Al-Qaeda and ISIS, Yusuf, previous leader of Boko Haram, and Dan Fodio, a 
historical jihadist leader; Shekau radicalizes their teachings, thus escalating the 
conflicts against perceived enemies. Where Yusuf and Dan Fodio advocated local 
or regional jihad, Shekau clearly advocates global approaches, framing jihadism 
in opposition to a global hostile system. The presentation of specific crisis-points 
mediates radicalization, which perhaps can be an explanatory factor in the 
enormous increase of Boko Haram-membership since Shekau´s takeover 2009. 
Shekau constructs and presents, via media strategies implemented especially after 
the allegiance to Al-Qaeda and ISIS, new interpretations of jihadist-ideology 
further developed in relation to current crisis-points.  
 
An overarching systematic ideological construction is that of Boko Haram and all 
jihadists as victims, something I did not expect to be so emphasized throughout.  
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The perpetrators are all constructed as specific actors within a complex global 
system, designed to oppress Muslims. Thus, jihad as struggle has both local and 
global expressions, as does the system oppressing it. Democracy is clearly 
constructed as the primary weapon of the enemies, aimed at destroying Islam. In 
the end the clashes and wars are, according to Shekau, systematic and global, 
regardless of which forms they take in local contexts. They are consequently 
constructed in antithetical forms.  
 
The visual symbols and imagery in the form of al-raya, weapons, flags, attire and 
banners each provide elaborate jihadist-ideological contents, enhanced by 
Shekau´s dualistic role as imam and military leader. The contexts of war, weapon 
exercises and sermons by Shekau provide an ideological whole to the audience, 
where symbols and imagery constitutes latent ideology. Thus, we also note both 
latent and manifest ideology embodied in a charismatic leader, expressing 
characteristics such as fearlessness, piousness, rhetorical boldness, 
aggressiveness, relentlessness and a flair for spectacular appearances. Shekau 
approaches new crisis-points with both old and new interpretations of jihadism. 
He stands firmly on his predecessors, but also constructs new ideological thoughts 
and doctrines, and then summarizing them synthetically. It´s up to future scholars 
to further study these jihadist evolutionary teachings and actors.  
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9 Appendix: acronyms and short 
descriptions  
 
AQAP: “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula”, an al-Qaeda-affiliate jihadist 
movement operating mainly in Yemen, Saudi-Arabia and the Gulf states.  
 
AQIM: ”Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb”, an al-Qaeda-affiliate jihadist 
movement operating primarily in Algeria and Northern Africa. There is much 
evidence of connections with Boko Haram in the form of weapons exchange, 
training of jihadists, joint operations and ideological commitment (Onuohoa 
2014a).  
 
ISIS: “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria”, a jihadist movement which has established 
an Islamic caliphate within the geographical borders of Iraq and Syria, although 
its real presence is not limited only to those regions, but extends to most 
continents of the world via jihadist cells, supporting individuals and networks of 
support and financing. Boko Haram have pledged allegiance to ISIS, making it an 
affiliate-movement in the struggle for jihad in Africa (Comolli 2015b).   
 
CAN: “The Christian Association of Nigeria”, an ecumenical national 
organization working to safeguard Christian political interests, discussing subjects 
relating to education and other social-economic questions. CAN have often 
spoken out critically against Boko Haram, but have also tried to work out amnesty 
via the Nigerian government for jihadists willing to leave Boko Haram.  (Simons 
2015:137-161).  
 
CAR: “Central African Republic”, a coup d’état took place in an already volatile 
country in 2013, leading to lawlessness and a Muslim rebellion. There are 
indications, although presently unclear, that Boko Haram or Ansaru may be trying 
to establish themselves in CAR, thus adding to the jihadist expansion. (Comolli 
2015a:94-95).  
 
JMTF: “Joint Military Task Force”, a joint political-military coalition between 
Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger fighting to stop Boko Haram´s transnational 
expansion. The coalition, although successful in some measures, have also been 
accused of high-handedness, incompetence and critique has been delivered against 
internal bureaucracy and unwillingness to cooperate fully in some matters.  
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